Operation Harvest Moon
D
The plan for OPERATION HARVEST MOON / LIEN KET 18 directed the 5th ARVN
Regiment, consisting of the Headquarters Group and 1st Battalion and the 11th
Ranger Battalion to enter the
On 9 December, Lt. Colonel Utter's battalion was to be inserted behind the
enemy to force them eastward into the advancing ARVN. Lt. Colonel Dorsey's
battalion would then be inserted to reinforce Utter's unit when needed.
The VC Strike...and the
Marines are committed
The 5th ARVN Regiment left Thang Binh on schedule with the 11th Ranger
Battalion on the right of the road, and the Regiment's 1st Battalion on the
left. During the first few hours, the advance was uneventful. At 1330, about
half way to Que Son the Ranger battalion was ambushed by the 70th VC
Battalion.* The enemy allowed the ARVN to close within twenty meters and
then opened fire. In the first 15 minutes of the battle, the Rangers lost
nearly one third of their personnel and were overrun. According to an American
advisor who was with the ARVN force, "They attacked in a mass and hit us
from all sides...people were dropping around us right and left."
The badly mauled Ranger unit was able to withdraw to a position 1200 meters
to the northwest and then called in Marine air support. Skyhawks from MAG-12 at
Chu Lai attacked the Communist positions while Marine helicopters evacuated
many of the casualties.
The first ARVN Battalion attempted to reinforce the rangers but was unable
to cross the road because of enemy mortar fire and the
The next morning, the 5th ARVN Regiment command group and its 1st Battalion
bore the weight of the VC attack. Although the battalion had been probed during
the night, it had not seen heavy action. On 9 December, at about 0645, the 60th
and 80th VC Battalions struck. In the heavy fighting that followed, both the
1st Battalion and the regimental command group were overrun. The ARVN
regimental commander was killed and the ARVN force was scattered to the south
and east. At about the same time, another VC battalion attacked the 6th ARVN
Regiment to the northeast, but this ARVN unit managed to hold its ground.
At this point, General Henderson decided to commit his Marines. At 1000
hours, UH-3Ds from Denny's HMM-161 and Lt. Colonel Lloyd Childers HMM-361
lifted Utter's 2nd Battalion from Tam Key to a landing zone 5 1/2 miles west of
the ARVN troops. After the landing, the battalion moved northeast, securing a
hill mass 2,500 meters from the landing zone by late afternoon.
Utter's Marines encountered only a few Viet Cong and one of his platoon
leaders complained: "The enemy always seemed one step ahead of us."
The same afternoon, General Henderson directed Dorsey's 3rd battalion, 3rd
Marines to land 1 1/2 miles southeast of the 5th ARVN Regiment's 1st Battalion
and then move to link up with the shattered South Vietnamese unit.
Lt. Colonel Dorsey's Marines had left
The 3rd Battalion landed at 1400 hours, and an hour and a half later, the
battalion's lead unit, Company L, made contact with elements of the ARVN
battalion and pushed northwestward toward Hill 43, 1 1/2 miles from the landing
zone. Before the Marines could reach the hill, they ran into a force of 200 VC.
The firefight raged into the early evening. Supported by Marine air and
artillery, Dorsey estimated that his battalion had killed 75 VC. Eleven Marines
were dead and 17 wounded. The VC broke contact as darkness fell and the
battalion established night positions. The next morning, the Marines took Hill
43, where they joined 40 South Vietnamese soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 5th
Regiment.
On the 10th of December, General Henderson ordered Utter to drive east and
Dorsey to push northwest to compress the enemy between them. The avenue of
escape to the south was to be closed by Lt. Colonel Robert T. Hannifin Jr's
2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, the SLF battalion which would be lifted
into the area by Porter's HMM-261.
At 1100, 15 UH-34Ds from the
Colonel Michael R. Yunck**, the 1st MAW G3, who had volunteered to act as
Tactical Air Controller (Airborne) for the assault mission remembered: "We
thought the LZ was far enough from the hill to the south to nullify effective
fire from that distance and pretty well scrubbed the immediate area of the
LZ." As the assault helicopters lifted off, Yunck maneuvered his UH-1E
over the landing zone to locate the enemy gunners, but in the process was
wounded by a 12.7 round. His Co-pilot, Major Edward Kuykendall, took control of
the air operation and directed the remaining helicopters carrying Hannifin's
command group and Company G to land in another LZ further west.
Company F at the first landing site was in trouble. The enemy kept the
Marines under continuous machine gun fire and then opened up with mortars and
small arms fire. The company took what cover it could in the open rice paddies
and waited for reinforcements. Since the rest of the battalion had landed to
the west, the task force commander ordered a company from Utter's battalion to
move south to aid the hard-hit unit. Company E, 2/7, pushed southward to
Hannifin's Company F, but was hit on its right flank by enemy fire. With some
difficulty, Company E reached an area from which it could support the stranded
company. Company F began withdrawing under the relief force's covering fire.
Ten hours after the first helicopter had landed. Hannifin's battalion command
group, Company’s G and F, and Company E from Utter's battalion joined forces.
Both Companies E and F had suffered substantial casualties during the day...20
dead and over 80 wounded.***
As darkness fell on the battlefield that day, General Walt relieved General
Henderson. Brigadier General Jonas M. Platt became the head of Task Force
Delta. General Platt, appraised of the battle situation, ordered another of
Utter's companies to reinforce the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines. Company
G, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines arrived at Hannifin's position at 0300 the next
morning.
The Search of the Phouc Ha
Valley
On the 11th of December Task Force Delta maneuvered to consolidate its
position, and General Platt, airborne in a helicopter, studied the terrain from
which the Marines of Company F and helicopters of HMM-261 had received such
extensive fire on the 10th of December. The General, surprised that his craft
did not draw any fire, surmised that the Viet Cong must have abandoned their
positions on Hill 407 during the night. Platt, therefore, ordered Col. Utter to
seize the hill, a task which 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines accomplished without
opposition.
In the interim, Col. Dorsey's 3rd Battalion searched the area north of
Hill 407, while the remaining two companies of Hannifin's 2nd
Battalion, 1st Marines were heli-lifted from the ARG ships to join the
battalion. By the end of the day, it was apparent that the enemy, except for a
few snipers, had vanished. General Platt suspected that the regiment had
retreated into the Phouc Ha Valley, a smaller valley paralleling the
Lt. Colonel Joshua W. Dorsey Commanding Officer, 3rd Bn, 3rd Marines
confers with Brigadier General Jonas M. Platt . Dorsey's battalion is about to
enter the Phuoc Ha Valley, a known VC main base area.
General Platt, on board a helicopter observed the first strike and
directed Dorsey and Hannifin to move their battalions in to exploit the bombing
mission. During the afternoon, Hannifin's battalion deployed south of the
valley while Dorsey moved along two ridges, Hills 100 and 180, overlooking the
northern entrances to the Phuoc Ha Valley. During the night of 12 December,
General Platt ordered Dorsey to move 1,000 meters to the north so that the
B52's could strike the valley again.
The next morning, after the second B52 air strike, the two Marine
battalions entered the valley from both the north and the south. While
searching the target area, Dorsey's battalion did not find the 1st VC Regiment,
but discovered large amounts of enemy supplies and equipment. The two
battalions remained in the valley for the next few days, but encountered little
organized resistance.
The fight at Ky Phu
While the two battalions were operating in the Phouc Ha Valley, Utter's
battalion sought the VC along along the northern bank of the Song Chang, also
known as the
On 18 December, the 2nd Bn, 7th Marines, on the last leg of its long
trek, encountered the 80th VC Battalion in strength. Earlier that morning,
after evacuating 54 Marines suffering from immersion foot, the battalion moved
out in column formation with company G in the lead, followed by Company F,
H&S, and Company H, 2nd Bn, 9th Marines. The Marines moved along a narrow
road which wound through hedgerow-bordered rice paddies. The Viet Cong allowed
the lead company to pass through the
Company F had just passed through the east end of Ky Phu when enemy
mortar rounds dropped on H&S Company, still in the open paddies west of the
hamlet. Two VC companies tried to enter the gap between Company F and H&S
and envelop Utter's command group and H&S Company. 1st Lt. Nicholas Grosz,
Jr. recalled that he crossed the area between his company and the battalion
command group and told Col. Utter of the "H&S deteriorating
situation". Realizing that he was engaged with a major enemy force, the
battalion commander ordered Company F to turn and attack the "main VC
positions on the H&S right flank."
Supported by "Huey" gunships and accurate
artillery from
At the rear of the column, Company H remained in contact with the enemy;
a VC company struck the Marines from both flanks and the rear. Both the company
commander and his radio operator were mortally wounded. 1st Lt. Harvey C.
Barnum, the attached artillery forward observer, did what he could to save the
two dying Marines, strapped the radio on his back and assumed command. The young
officer rallied the company and the Marines established a defensive position on
a small hill north of the road. After four hours of fighting, Barnum led
Company H into Ky Phu and rejoined the battalion.****
By nightfall, the fight at Ky Phu was over. The 80th VC
Battalion broke, leaving 104 bodies on the battlefield, 76 of them killed by
the artillery fire. Col. Utter's command had sustained 11 killed and 71
wounded.
The Wrap-Up
The next day, 19 December, all three of the Marine battalions completed
their movement out of the operation area. For all practical purposes, the
Operation was over, but Operation Harvest Moon / Lien Ket ended officially on
20 December when all allied forces returned to their enclaves. The combined
USMC-ARVN operation had accounted for 407 enemy killed, 33 captured, and 13
crew-served and 95 individual weapons seized. In addition, 60 tons of food and
ammunition were taken in the Phuoc Ha Valley. Marine casualties were 45 killed
and 218 wounded. General Lam's forces suffered 90 killed, 91 missing, and 141
wounded, most occurring during the first two days of the operation.
Operation Harvest Moon was not without its problems. The hastily
established provisional headquarters, the fast moving ground situation, poor
weather conditions, and the large number of tactical aircraft operating over
the
Harvest Moon was the last of the Marine's big battles in 1965. These
large-scale efforts had become a regular feature of the war for General Walt's
forces. During the last half of its first calendar year in country, III MAF
conducted 15 operations of battalion size or larger. American intelligence
agencies indicated that during 1966, General Walt's forces would face even
larger enemy forces as North Vietnamese troops entered
...we cannot be entrapped in
the dangerous premise that destruction of the VC organized units per se is the
whole answer to winning the war, any more than we can accept the erroneous view
that pacification and civic action will solve the problem if major enemy forces
are free to roam the countryside.
*The 70th Battalion, although not organic to the 1st VC Regiment, was
attached during this period. Colonel Ralph E. Sullivan recalled that
information on Harvest Moon was severely restricted. According to Sullivan, the
5th ARVN regimental commander was told his mission "was to be a routine
'sweep and clear' along Highway 1 to the vicinity of Key Lam. Upon reaching the
vicinity of Thang Binh [the regimental commander] was brought to the
"bunker" at
**Colonel Yunck was the 1963 Marine Aviator of the Year. He was
awarded his second Silver Star for his actions during Harvest Moon. His leg had
to be amputated as a result of the wound he suffered during the battle.
***One of those casualties was Captain James E. Page, Company F
commander, who had been pronounced dead on the battlefield. The next day
medical personnel checking the bodies detected a faint heart beat and evacuated
Capt. Page to a hospital the captain recovered.
****Lt. Barnum was performing temporary duty in